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The new empirical industrial organization approach with the Bertrand model is employed to 
measure the oligopsony market power in the U.S. cattle procurement market. The 
assumption of price competition (Bertrand model) based on the nature of cattle production 
such as cattle cycle and seasonality is used and compared to quantity competition (Cournot 
model). The empirical results show that the oligopsony market power exists in the U.S. 
cattle procurement market. The cattle cycle and seasonality affect the oligopsony market 
power and the cattle cycle causes the change of market power. However, concentration has 
a negative effect on the oligopsony market power. 
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Dynamic Assessment of Bertrand Oligopsony in the U.S. Cattle Procurement Market 
 
Introduction 
Most studies using the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach on the 
market power of the U.S. beef packing industry focus on the market structure, such as 
horizontal concentration and vertical integration, as sources of market power rather than 
characteristics of the market such as cattle cycle and seasonality. Also, the studies generally 
use the Cournot model by assuming quantity competition in the cattle procurement market.  
Cattle production fluctuates unpredictably based on weather conditions and 
economic environment while beef demand is relatively stable and predictable. The 
fluctuation of cattle production leads to price fluctuation and these variations could 
influence the bargaining position of producers and packers in the cattle procurement market 
(Crespi, Xia, and Jones 2010). Therefore, the periodic fluctuation of the cattle production, 
cattle cycle and seasonality, could affect market power in the cattle procurement market. In 
addition, this fluctuation in cattle supply could make packers compete with price rather than 
quantity. 
In the long-run, packers make significant production decisions based on quantity 
such as increasing factory size, purchasing slaughter machines or packing machines, as well 
as other investments. These decisions could lead to quantity competition. However, in the 
short-run, cattle purchase could lead to price competition (Lepore 2008). Under the 
condition of fixed plant capacity, if packers’ cattle amount is not guaranteed in the cattle 
market during the short cattle supply then they would aggressively bid to obtain their 2 
 
optimal operation level of cattle for beef production. On the other hand, if there is enough 
cattle supply in the market, then packers might try to lower the cattle price under the 
marginal cost for cattle production. This strategy for packers is consistent with the 
structural conduct performance (SCP) theory (Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen 1993). 
Additionally, the reason why packers gradually increase the volume of alternative 
marketing arrangements (captive supply) could be explained by this view point. Packers 
can reduce cattle supply risk and price competition by increasing captive supply during the 
short cattle supply and they might be tacitly collusive to lower the cattle price during the 
excess cattle supply. From this perspective, the cattle cycle and seasonality may affect 
pricing and market power in the cattle market. It therefore stands to reason that the Bertrand 
model is more accurate than the Cournot model to measure the oligopsony market power 
for the cattle procurement market. 
The objective of this paper is three fold. First, this paper provides a conceptual 
framework for the Bertrand model to analyze oligopsony market power and to compare the 
Bertrand model with the Cournot model. Second, this paper estimates the overall market 
power with the static model and annual market power changes with the dynamic model at 
national and two regional levels. Finally, the effects of concentration, cattle cycle, and 
seasonality on markdown for cattle price are estimated to look into how they influence on 
market power in the U.S. cattle procurement market.  
The empirical results show that oligopsony market power exists in the cattle 
procurement market and that oligopsony market power is affected by cattle cycle and 
seasonality and, finally, that the variation of market power changes equivalently with the 3 
 
cattle cycle. However, concentration has a negative effect on market power in the cattle 
procurement market. 
Concentration, Cattle cycle, and Seasonality 
The concentration for cattle procurement was drastically increased during the 1980’s and 
has stayed at high levels after 1990 (USDA). Figure 1 shows the concentration change 
based on Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for steer and heifer slaughter. The HHI was 
0.0561 in 1980 but it was rapidly increased by 0.2005 in 1992, and has stayed around 0.2 
until recently. The Department of Justice consider the industry to be concentrated if the 
HHI is greater than 0.18. Therefore, concentration has been in the middle of controversy for 
the market power issue in the cattle procurement market during the last three decades. 
  Cattle cycles are measured from one trough to the next. There are six full cycles in 
cattle inventories since 1928 and the average length of cattle cycles are about 10 years 
(Anderson, Robb, and Mintert 1996). Figure 2 shows the cattle cycle based on cattle supply 
from 1980 to 2009. The fifth cycle began in 1979 and the sixth cycle began in 1990. The 
latest cycle began in 2004 and cattle supplies show an increasing trend.  
A seasonal pattern is a regularly repeating cycle that is completed once every twelve 
months. Figure 2 shows the averaged monthly changes of the slaughtered cattle supply 
from 1980 to 2009. The slaughtered cattle quantities are high from May to October while 
those from November to April are low. These cattle cycle and seasonality cycles are 




Most studies using NEIO approach use the Cournot model to analyze market power for the 
U.S. beef packing industry because it is easy to parameterize the conjectural elasticity, price 
elasticity of demand, and price elasticity of supply using simultaneous equations. 
Additionally, those elasticities can be used to easily calculate market power (Schroeter 
1988; Azzam and Schroeter 1995; Azzam 1997; Sexton 2000; Lopez, Azzam and Espana 
2002; Tostao and Chung 2005; Zheng and Vukina 2009). 
  There are three studies that use the Bertrand oligopsony model for the cattle market 
(Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson 1993; Koontz and Garcia 1997; Cai, Stiegert, and Koontz 
2009). They develop the Regime-Switching model based on the dynamic non-cooperative 
game theoretic model. They find that the evidence of cooperative/competitive conduct 
among the beef packers is present, but the conduct varies across markets. They attempt to 
determine whether the cooperative conduct is present as evidence of market power, but they 
don’t estimate the conduct parameters in the cattle procurement market.  
Two studies are concerned with cattle supply and cattle cycle. Stiegert, Azzam, and 
Brorsen (1993) use the NEIO model assuming quantity competition to determine the effect 
of anticipated and unanticipated cattle supply on the departure of fed cattle prices from 
cattle’s marginal value product. They find that packers follow an average processing cost 
(APC) pricing rule and that reducing concentration is unlikely to affect change in cattle 
prices predicted by SCP based studies of the industry
1. They use anticipated and 
                                                 
1  Average processing cost (APC) pricing is that packers establish a cattle bid price by subtracting the average 
processing cost from the price received for carcasses or boxed beef while the structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) paradigm theory suggests that the markdown will respond to supply changes, but in a direction 5 
 
unanticipated cattle supply to look into packer’s behavior, primarily how packers react to 
those cattle supplies. The anticipated cattle supply is specified by the cattle on feed, cattle 
placements, and the seasonal dummy variable. Therefore, the effects of cattle cycle and 
seasonality are embedded in the anticipated cattle supply. Consequently, they do not 
explain the effects of cattle cycle and seasonality. Crespi, Xia and Jones (2010) investigate 
the relationship between market power and cattle cycle with a dynamic cattle production 
decision model and a dynamic profit maximization model based on the Cournot model. 
They provide a conceptual framework for how the cattle cycle and buyer markets are 
related. They find that a larger cattle stock leads to a lower fed cattle price and the cattle 
stock’s negative effect on price is magnified by the degree of buyer market power. They 
develop an equilibrium model that consists of the dynamic cattle supply equation for 
feeders and dynamic cattle demand for packers. However, they assume that the market 
power is determined by the number of packers rather than the packer’s market conducts.  
Therefore, this paper extends the traditional NEIO model in two ways. First, this 
paper provides how the implications of market power from the Bertrand model differ 
compared to the Cournot model through analytical derivation. Second, concentration in the 
traditional view as well as cattle cycle and seasonality for the nature of cattle market are 
included in modeling the market conduct equation in order to measure their effects on 
market power. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
opposite to that of APC pricing. That is, as anticipated supply declines, packers bid more aggressive while 
anticipated supply is abundant, bidding becomes less aggressively and the markdown increases (Stiegert, 
Azzam, and Brorsen 1993). 6 
 
The Model 
The two NEIO models are reviewed in this section: the Bertrand model and the Cournot 
model. We analyze the input market rather than output market, so we use monopsony or 
oligopsony as working terms instead of monopoly or oligopoly. In the Bertrand oligopsony 
model, buyers choose the price to pay for a unit of input, which affects the market supply. 
The Bertrand model predicts that a duopsony is enough to push prices up to the marginal 
cost level for input production. This suggests that duopsony will result in perfect 
competition, commonly referred to in the economics literature as the “Bertrand paradox”. 
However, in the Cournot oligopsony model, where buyers compete strategically with their 
quantity, buyers enjoy positive profits as the resulting input market prices do not exceed 
those of the marginal costs. By imposing some assumptions in the modeling, we will 
demonstrate how this suggestion that duopsony will result in perfect competition in the 
Bertrand model could be changed. 
Bertrand Model 
In view of the intended application, we will focus on oligopsony market power in the cattle 
procurement market. Packers determine cattle price as a strategy variable to maximize their 
profit from the cattle procurement market while the wholesale price to sell their output, 
boxed beef, to the retailer is assumed as a given. The cattle supply is assumed as fixed in 
the short-run because feeders cannot increase their cattle supply in the short-run. Feeders 
cannot determine the cattle supply, but they can sell their cattle to the highest bidder in the 
cattle market. 7 
 
In the beef processing industry it is assumed that  N  packers convert a single farm 
input, cattle, into a final output, boxed beef, with fixed proportions technology between the 
farm input and the output (Schroeter 1988; Azzam 1997). Conversion of the farm input into 
output requires non-farm inputs that are purchased in competitive markets. Profit,  i  , for 
the i th firm (for  N i , , 2 , 1   ) is: 
(1)                      ) ), ( , ( ( )) ( , ( v i j i i i i j i i i i
w
w w w q C w w w q w P Max
i
    , 
where  P  is the boxed beef wholesale price,  i w  is the cattle input price for i th firm,  j w  is 
the cattle input price for  j th firm (for  N j , , 2 , 1    and  j i  ),  i q  is the i th firm’s beef 
product or cattle input,  ) , ( v i i q C  is the processing cost for the i th firm, and v is a vector of 
prices of non-farm inputs. The first order condition for profit maximization is: 





































































Rearranging the first order condition and re-writing in elasticity form yields: 




















































   is the price conjectural elasticity of  j th firm with respect to i









) , ( v
 is the i th firm’s marginal cost. 
If we assume that the effect of the  j th firm’s price change on the i th firm’s fed 
cattle purchase is smaller than the effect of its own price change, and firms are symmetric 






















 and then we can write the 
ratio of own price elasticity of cattle procurement to cross price elasticity with respect to  j


































   , then the equation (3) 
becomes: 
























ji i  . In equilibrium, all firms have the same value  i  ,  i R  and  ii  , then the 
industry level margin equation can be yield (Appelbaum 1982; Schroeter 1988): 
















where W  is the industrial level cattle price, 
 
is the industrial level price conjectural 
elasticity,  R  is the industrial level ratio of own price elasticity of cattle procurement to 9 
 
cross price elasticity,  b   is the own price elasticity of cattle purchase, and mc is the 
industrial level marginal cost. 
In equation (5), the term in the left side is the industrial level margin for a unit of 
cattle, the first term on the right side is markdown for a unit of cattle in the cattle 
procurement market, and the second term on the right side is the marginal cost for a unit of 
cattle in the beef processing industry. For analyzing the short-run oligopsony power in the 
cattle procurement market we should look at the markdown term. The markdown is 
determined by three parameters: the price conjectural elasticity, the ratio of own price 
elasticity of cattle procurement to cross price elasticity, and the own price elasticity of 
cattle purchase. These three parameters show the market participant’s reactions about a 
firm’s cattle pricing change. That is, the price conjectural elasticity shows the reaction of 
the rival’s cattle pricing, the ratio of own price elasticity of cattle procurement to cross 
price elasticity shows the relative effect firms’ price change on a firm’s cattle purchase, and 
the own price elasticity of cattle purchase reveals the decision of the feeder’s cattle supply 
decision to choose who they sell their cattle to, corresponding to a firm’s pricing change. 
The own price elasticity of cattle purchase,  b  , is an infinite in the traditional view 
of the Bertrand model so that the market will reflect perfect competition with no markdown 
in the industry.
2 In reality, however, there are some restrictions like capacity constraints. If 
a single firm does not have the capacity to procure the whole cattle market then the “price 
                                                 
2  The Bertrand model rests on the following assumptions: 1) There are at least two firms producing 
homogeneous (undifferentiated) products; 2) Firms do not cooperate; 3) Firms compete by setting prices 
simultaneously; 4) Consumers buy everything from a firm with a lower price. If all firms charge the same 
price, consumers randomly select among them (Bertrand 1883). The fourth assumption represents that the 
own price elasticity is infinite. 
 10 
 
equals marginal cost” result may not hold. Thus, the range of the own price elasticity of 
cattle purchase will be     b  0 . This reflects that the “Bertrand paradox” can be fixed if 
the own price elasticity of cattle purchase is quite smaller than the infinite. The own price 







   (Anderson, Palma, and Kreider 2001). 
For the market conduct in equation (5), when    b  , the market will be perfect 
competition. When     b  0 , the market will be oligopsony or monopsony. Under this 
assumption,     b  0 , market conduct depends on the price conjectural elasticity,  . 
0    means Bertrand-Nash when  1  N  and pure monopsony when  1  N .  1    means 
cartel or symmetry among the firms and  R    0  means oligopsony.
3 
Cournot Model 
Alternatively, in the Cournot model packers determine cattle quantities as a strategy 
variable to procure the cattle from the cattle procurement market and feeders determine the 
cattle supply to the cattle procurement market. Finally, cattle price is determined in the 
market by cattle supply and demand. That is, the fixed supply assumption is released by 
long-run decision making for feeders and the feeders face a competitive market for selling 
their cattle to packers. Under the same assumption of the fixed proportions technology, then 
i th firm’s profit is: 
                                                 
3  Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson (1993) interpret the value of  0    means packers display non-cooperative 
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i
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where  P  is the beef wholesale price, W  is the cattle price in the market level, and  i q  is the 
i th firm’s cattle or boxed beef quantity. The first order condition for profit maximization 
is:
 





























Rearranging the first order condition and re-writing in elasticity form yields: 
(8)                                           i
c






















   is the 
price elasticity of cattle supply in the cattle procurement market. In equilibrium, all firms 
have the same value  i  , then the industry level margin equation can be written (Appelbaum 
1982; Schroeter 1988): 








In the Cournot model, markdown consists of the quantity conjectural elasticity,  , 
and the cattle supply elasticity,  c  . The range of conjectural elasticity is between 0 and 1. 
The value  0    means perfect competition and  1    means pure monopsony, and other 
values mean various degrees of oligopsony power with higher values of   denoting 
greater oligopsony (Appelbaum 1982). The price elasticity of cattle supply,  c  , is 12 
 
considered as  1 0   c   because price elasticity of supply for agricultural markets are 
usually inelastic and positive. 
Empirical procedures 
For econometric estimation, we assume a generalized Leontief cost function (Diewert 1974; 
Schroeter 1988) for the beef processing industry: 




j k kj v v v Q Q C      
2 1 ) ( ) , ( v ,  
where  j v  and  k v  are the input price of labor, capital, and material. Then the industrial level 
marginal processing cost function is given by: 
(11)                                              
k j
j k kj v v mc
2 1 ) (  ,  
by substituting equation (11) into equation (5), we obtain the industrial level Bertrand 
margin equation: 
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 is the industry-wide markdown in cattle prices from cattle’s marginal 
value and  b e  is the error term for the Bertrand margin equation respectively. However, the 
parameters in the industry-wide markdown cannot be estimated because of limitation of 
firm level data. Consequently, we estimate the whole part of the industry-wide markdown, 






 , as follow: 13 
 
(13)                                b
k j
j k kj e v v W M W P      
2 1 ) (  . 
To estimate the margin equations (13), simultaneous equations are needed such as 
three non-farm input demand equations. Non-farm input demands are obtained by applying 
Shephard’s lemma on the industry level processing cost function represented by equation 
(10) as: 
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which can be re-arranged as: 























where  j X  is the industry level derived non-farm input demand for labor, capital, and 
material,  Q X j  is the inverse of productivity for each non-farm input, and  j e  is the error 
term for the non-farm input demand equation respectively. 
Finally, to analyze the effect of concentration, cattle cycle, and seasonality on the 
cattle price, we make the markdown as a function of these variables. This specification also 
allows the dynamic estimation of the market conduct over time. The industry-wide 
markdown M  is specified as:
                    
 
(16)                           3 5 2 4 1 3 2 1 0 D D D C H M             , 
where  H  is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, C  is the cattle cycle, and  i D  with  3 , 2 , 1  i  
are seasonal dummy variables, and  ’s are parameters. In order to generate cattle cycle 
variability, the following yearly cattle supply equation is estimated: 14 
 
(17)                                          q time Q       1 0 , 
and the cattle cycle variable,  Q Q C ˆ   , is calculated for each year. If equation (16) 
substitutes into equation (13), then dynamic equation can be written as: 
 (18)        d
k j
j k kj e v v W D D D C H W P           
2 1
3 5 2 4 1 3 2 1 0 ) ( ) (        . 
We utilize two systems: the static model and the dynamic model for three regions: 
National, Nebraska, and Texas. Equations (13) and (15) constitute a system of four 
equations for the static model and equations (18) and (15) constitute a system of four 
equations for the dynamic model. We use the generalized method of moment (GMM) 
which employs instrumental variable estimators since the system equations have 
endogeneity problems. GMM also provides a consistent estimator when heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation are present (Breusch 1978; Godfrey 1978). The eighteen instrumental 
variables included in the equation are Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the steer and 
heifer slaughter, 5 market steer weighted price, Nebraska steer and heifer weighted price, 
Texas steer and heifer weighted price, labor price, capital price, material price, cattle on 
feed, cattle placement, cattle on marketing, disappearance, cycle, seasonal dummy variables, 
time, and squared time. The industry-wide markdown rates as market power indices and 
markdowns in cattle prices from cattle’s marginal value for each year are also estimated 
through GMM using the MODEL Procedure in SAS 9.2. 
The first null hypothesis is that oligopsony market power in the U.S. cattle 
procurement market equal zero. Rejecting it suggests that packers exert oligopsony market 
power in the U.S. cattle procurement market. The second null hypothesis is that the 15 
 
concentration, the cattle cycle, and the seasonality have no effect on the oligopsony market 
power. Rejecting it suggests that the concentration, the cattle cycle, and the seasonality 
might be used as a way to price under the marginal cost for cattle production. 
Data 
In this paper, we use monthly data series for the U.S. cattle procurement market ranging 
from 1980 to 2009. As National, Nebraska, and Texas cattle supplies, the steer and heifer 
slaughter total live weights for National level, for Nebraska region, and Texas region are 
from Livestock Slaughter Annual Summary of United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). The wholesale price and the 5 market steer weighted price data are from the beef 
value and price spread monthly data sets from the USDA Economic Research Service 
(ERS). The wholesale price is modified by including by-product value and by dividing with 
2.4 as conversion factor to a unit of live cattle (USDA). The steer and heifer weighted 
prices data for Nebraska and Texas are compiled from USDA Agricultural Marketing 
Service (AMS) data. The producer price index for farm products slaughter steer and heifer 
is from Bureau Labor Statistics (BLS). The price index and the productivity index of labor, 
capital, and material for U.S. food and other industries are obtained from the Major Sector 
Multifactor Productivity Index Database of BLS. The cattle on feed, the cattle placement, 
the cattle on marketing, and disappearance data are from the USDA National Agricultural 
Statistics Service and Red Meats Yearbook of USDA. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for 
the U.S. beef processing industry is the steer and heifer slaughter concentration index 
compiled from several annual reports from the Packers and Stockyards Statistical Report 16 
 
(1996-2009). The definitions and descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in 
table 1. 
Results 
The estimation results of the static model and the dynamic model for the National level, 
Nebraska region, and Texas region by GMM are reported in table 2 and 3. All of the 10 
parameter estimates in the static model and most parameter estimates in the dynamic model 
for National, Nebraska, and Texas are statistically significant at the 5% significance level.  
With these estimation results and with mean values of cattle prices and input prices, 
the market power parameters such as market power (industry-wide markdown rate), 
markdown, and marginal cost are calculated and summarized in table 4. As the key 
parameter, the market power estimates in the static model are 0.0366, 0.0199, and 0.0138 
for National, Nebraska, and Texas respectively while 0.0629, 0.0401, and 0.0377 in the 
dynamic model. The market power of National is the biggest compared to the two regions 
and the market power of Nebraska is greater than the market power of Texas. The market 
power from the dynamic model shows the same results with the static model, but their 
value is almost twice that of the static models’. The values of 0.0366, 0.0199, and 0.0138 
for market power in the static model mean that there are about 3.66 percent, 1.99 percent, 
and 1.38 percent of markdowns for the cattle price respectively. 
For the markdowns and the marginal costs, in the static model, the markdowns are 
2.6537, 1.4368, and 1.0039 and the marginal costs are 6.7237, 8.1916, and 8.0956 for 
National, Nebraska, and Texas respectively and they are all significant at the 5% 17 
 
significance level. In the dynamic model, the markdowns are 4.5645, 2.8905, and 2.7486 
and the marginal costs are 5.3866, 6.9359, and 6.5899 for National, Nebraska, and Texas 
respectively and they are also all significant at the 5% significance level. The markdown 
value of 2.6537 and marginal cost of 6.7237 for National in the static model mean that the 
average markdown for the cattle price is $ 2.65/cwt and the marginal cost of cattle slaughter 
is $ 6.72/cwt, respectively. These results of market power and markdown for Nebraska and 
Texas in the static model are similar to the results of Schroeter (1988) and Stiegert, Azzam, 
and Brorsen (1993) while the results for National and dynamic model are slightly bigger 
than their results.  
The dynamic model shows the effect of concentration, cattle cycle, and seasonality. 
The parameters of concentration, cattle cycle, and three seasonal variables for National are 
-0.2491, 0.0082, -0.0122, 0.0169, and 0.0085 respectively. They are all significant at the 5% 
significance level. Nebraska and Texas also show similar estimation results. These results 
signify that concentration has a negative impact on the cattle price markdown. That is, the 
markdown in cattle price is decreased by increasing the concentration. This result coincides 
with a majority of results from similar studies (Azzam 1997; Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen 
1993). The parameters of cattle cycle and seasonality for May-July and Aug-Oct are 
positive while the parameter of seasonality for Feb-Apr is negative. This result means that 
when the cattle supply is greater than the normal trends (or expected supply), packers 
exercise more market power in the cattle procurement market and vice versa. This result 
supports the view of SCP that when the cattle supply is inflated the packers tacitly collude 18 
 
to drop the cattle price. When the cattle supply is short the packers bid aggressively to get 
some amount of cattle in the cash market. 
The dynamic model allows market power to change over time, so we calculate the 
market powers for each year. Figure 4 shows the changes of the market power and cattle 
supply. The cattle supply fluctuates with an increasing trend while market power fluctuates 
with a decreasing trend. This decreasing trend of market power is incompatible with the 
traditional opinion that an increase of concentration will increase market power. However, 
the market power for National, Nebraska, and Texas have fluctuated along with the cattle 
cycle over the given time period. Therefore, we can conclude that the cattle cycle causes 
the oligopsony market power in the cattle procurement market and that the market power 
has been fluctuating and declining over time. This finding also coincides with the previous 
studies (Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen 1993; Crespi, Xia, and Jones 2010).  
In summary, the first null hypothesis that oligopsony market powers in the U.S. 
cattle procurement market equal zero is rejected in all regions and both static and dynamic 
model. Therefore, we can conclude that packers exert an oligopsony market power over the 
U.S. cattle procurement market. The second null hypotheses that the concentration, the 
cattle cycle, and the seasonality have no effect on the oligopsony market power are all 
rejected. That means the packers use the cattle supply and the seasonality to increase their 
margins by pricing cattle under the marginal cost of cattle production. However, the 
concentration has a negative effect on the oligopsony market power. That is, the markdown 
decreases by increasing the concentration for the sample period. This result may support the 19 
 
hypothesis that cost efficiency dominates the effect of market power by increasing the 
concentration. 
Conclusions 
There are many controversial issues about market power in the U.S. cattle procurement 
market. Many believe that the major beef processing companies attempt to merge and 
acquire the other companies as a viable strategy to increase their market powers. However, 
some studies indicate that such consolidation amongst packers leads to the increase of their 
efficiency in beef processing cost, rather than increasing the market power. Therefore, this 
study looks into the beef packing industry from the perspective that the market power may 
not be from the concentration, but from the characteristics of cattle production such as 
cattle cycle and seasonality. If the market power is caused by cattle supply, then the packers 
may compete with price instead of quantity. That is, following the SCP theory, when the 
cattle supply is short the packers might bid aggressively for procuring the cattle (low 
markdown) and when the cattle supply is enough the packers will bid less aggressively 
(high markdown).  
From this view point, we use the Bertrand model that assumes price competition in 
the market and we compare it to the Cournot model. In addition, the dynamic model with 
the time varying model is used to look into the dynamic change of market conducts which 
is caused by the concentration, the cattle cycle, and the seasonality for the U.S. cattle 
procurement market. Three regions: National, Nebraska, and Texas, are estimated with the 
monthly data from 1980 to 2007. 20 
 
The empirical results show that there exists oligopsony market power in the U.S. 
cattle procurement market. The oligopsony market power is influenced by the cattle cycle 
and seasonality. That is, the packers may tacitly collude during the excessive cattle supply 
period, while biding to price more aggressively during the short cattle supply period. The 
variation of market power equivalently changes with the cattle cycle. However, 
concentration has a negative effect on market power in cattle procurement market. These 
results suggest that it is more important to make cattle supply stable and to continue 
monitoring the cattle procurement market to assure a competitive performance. 
Nevertheless, this research is limited in estimating the Bertrand model derived from this 
study because the parameters to be estimated require firm level data. Therefore, additional 
research needs to develop a more suitable model to continue this study.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Empirical Estimation (1980.1-
2009.12, N=360) 
Variable  Symbol  Mean  S. D.  Minimum  Maximum 
National margin (cattle price based) 
($/cwt)  W P      10.82    2.87      4.64    21.04 
Nebraska margin (cattle price 
based) ($/cwt)  W P      11.12    2.83      4.81    22.05 
Texas margin (cattle price based) 
($/cwt) 
W P      10.39    3.09      4.63    20.38 
Wholesale price of boxed beef 
($/cwt)  P   201.10  29.65  146.00  292.99 
National cattle price (5 market steer 
price) ($/cwt)  W     72.47  10.30    52.33  100.67 
Nebraska cattle price (steer and 
heifer weighted price) ($/cwt)  W     72.16  10.27    52.70  102.63 
Texas cattle price (steer and heifer 
weighted price) ($/cwt)  W     72.88  10.23    53.80    99.81 
Herfindahl Hirschman index for 
steer and heifer slaughter  H   0.1606  0.0464  0.0561  0.2096 
National steer and heifer slaughter 
weight (bil./lbs)  Q   2.6673  0.2852  2.0420  3.3290 
Nebraska steer and heifer slaughter 
weight (bil./lbs) 
Q   1.3669  0.2081  0.9169  1.8218 
National steer and heifer slaughter 
weight (bil./lbs) 
Q   0.4958  0.0625  0.3683  0.6640 
Labor productivity (2000=100)  l X Q     97.04    8.13    83.57  112.85 
Price of labor (2000=100)  l v     88.88  27.14    44.26  138.92 
Capital productivity (2000=100)  c X Q   102.25    1.73    99.58  105.62 
Price of capital (2000=100)  c v     78.37  20.53    45.92  111.85 
Material productivity (2000=100)  m X Q     90.56    7.87    78.18  102.57 
Price of material (2000=100)  m v   100.83  21.26    70.50  159.97 
PPI for farm products slaughter 
steers and heifers (2000=100)  PPI  
104.63    14.32    73.28  157.47 
Cycle (bil./lbs)  C   0.0036  1.4399  -2.4688  2.1768 
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Table 2. Estimates of the Parameters for the Bertrand and Cournot Models for the National, 
Nebraska, and Texas regions cattle procurement market by GMM 
Parameter  Natioanl  Nebraska  Texas 
M    0.0366 (0.0035)   0.0199 (0.0030)   0.0138 (0.0030) 
ll     2.5482 (0.0646)   2.8537 (0.0030)   2.3866 (0.0563) 
cc     0.8399 (0.0196)   0.5890 (0.0122)   0.4369 (0.0083) 
mm     3.2068 (0.0881)   3.1615 (0.0783)   2.7948 (0.0716) 
lc     0.1974 (0.0090)   0.1036 (0.0096)   0.2540 (0.0093) 
cm    -0.8431 (0.0247)  -0.5181 (0.0154)  -0.5190 (0.0144) 
ml    -2.5985 (0.0681)  -2.8287 (0.0673)  -2.4834 (0.0610) 
l     0.2767 (0.0113)   0.1997 (0.0071)   0.0420 (0.0023) 
c    -0.1801 (0.0094)  -0.1188 (0.0045)  -0.0477 (0.0014) 
m    -0.1562 (0.1031)  -0.1279 (0.0069)  -0.0174 (0.0023) 
Notes: All parameters are significant at the 5% significance level. 
           Parentheses are approximate standard errors. 
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Table 3. Estimates of the Parameters for the Dynamic Model for the National, Nebraska, 
and Texas regions cattle procurement market by GMM 
Parameter  National  Nebraska  Texas 
0     0.0996 (0.0048)**   0.0556 (0.0068)**   0.0467 (0.0057)** 
1    -0.2491 (0.0193)**  -0.1017 (0.0266)**  -0.0923 (0.0231)** 
2     0.0082 (0.0005)**   0.0078 (0.0005)**   0.0078 (0.0005)** 
3    -0.0122 (0.0021)**  -0.0156 (0.0023)**  -0.0096 (0.0023)* 
4     0.0169 (0.0024)**   0.0138 (0.0026)**   0.0216 (0.0024)** 
5     0.0085 (0.0026)**   0.0049 (0.0027)*   0.0113 (0.0026)** 
ll     2.2445 (0.0899)**   3.4504 (0.1371)**   2.8893 (0.1079)** 
cc     1.2642 (0.0520)**   1.2656 (0.0505)**   1.1123 (0.0396)** 
mm     1.5938 (0.0736)**   2.1705 (0.0993)**   1.7552 (0.0786)** 
lc    -0.7592 (0.0311)**  -1.1053 (0.0434)**  -0.9295 (0.0331)** 
cm    -0.3474 (0.0182)**  -0.0063 (0.0116)  -0.0282 (0.0069)** 
ml    -1.4017 (0.0595)**  -2.2825 (0.0971)**  -0.8708 (0.0765)** 
l     0.0302 (0.0191)   0.1341 (0.0158)**   0.0174 (0.0044)** 
c    -0.1331 (0.0146)**  -0.1042 (0.0083)**  -0.0415 (0.0026)** 
m     0.0410 (0.0147)**  -0.0690 (0.0116)**   0.0052 (0.0036) 
Notes: *  significant at the 10% significance level. 
           ** significant at the 5% significance level. 
           Parentheses are approximate standard errors. 
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Table 4. Oligopsony Market Power, Markdown, and Marginal Cost for the U.S. Cattle 
Procurement Market 
Market Power 
Static Model  Dynamic Model 











































Notes: Parentheses are approximate standard errors. 
           All estimates are statistical significant at the 5% significance level. 
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Figure 1. The Concentration (HHI for Steer and Heifer) Change for U.S. Cattle 
Procurement Market from 1980 to 2009 
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Figure 2. The Cattle Supply for the U.S. Cattle Procurement Market from 1980 to 2009 
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Figure 3. The Average Monthly Changes of Slaughtered Cattle for the U.S. Cattle 
Procurement Market from 1980 to 2009 
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Figure 4. The Changes of Market Power and Cattle Supply for the U.S. Cattle Procurement 
Market from 1980 to 2007 
 
 